Ninth Circuit Correctly Rules That Dating App Isn’t Liable for Matching Users

AI Analysis

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit correctly upheld Section 230 immunity for Grindr, a popular dating app, in the case Doe v. Grindr. The court dismissed all plaintiff's claims, except for the sex trafficking claim, holding that Section 230 bars nearly all claims. EFF and the Woodhull Freedom Foundation supported Grindr's position with an amicus brief. While real-world harms occur online, they can be addressed by holding perpetrators accountable. The case highlights the challenges of balancing free speech and responsibility on online platforms. Sex trafficking claims may provide a way forward for addressing such harm.

Key Points

  • Section 230 Immunity: A Double-Edged Sword: While Section 230 provides essential protection for online platforms, it can also create difficulties in holding perpetrators accountable for real-world harm caused by their actions.r
  • The Responsibility of Dating Apps: Can dating apps be held responsible for the actions of users, and if so, how can they be incentivized to prevent such harm?r
  • Sex Trafficking Claims: A Path Forward: Should sex trafficking claims, like in Doe v. Grindr, be exempt from Section 230 immunity, and what implications would this have on online platforms and law enforcement?

Original Article

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit correctly held that Grindr, a popular dating app, can’t be held responsible for matching users and enabling them to exchange messages that led to real-world harm. EFF and the Woodhull Freedom Foundation filed an amicus brief in the Ninth Circuit in support of Grindr.

Grindr and other dating apps are possible thanks to strong Section 230 immunity. Without this protection, dating apps—and other platforms that host user-generated content—would have more incentive to censor people online. While real-world harms do happen when people connect online, these can be directly redressed by holding perpetrators who did the harm accountable.

The case, Doe v. Grindr, was brought by a plaintiff who was 15 years old when he signed up for Grindr but claimed to be over 18 years old to use the app. He was matched with other users and exchanged messages with them. This led to four in-person meetings that resulted in three out of four adult men being prosecuted for rape.

The plaintiff brought various state law claims against Grindr centering around the idea that the app was defectively designed, enabling him to be matched with and to communicate with the adults. The plaintiff also brought a federal civil sex trafficking claim.

Grindr invoked Section 230, the federal statute that has ensured a free and open internet for nearly 30 years. Section 230(c)(1) specifically provides that online services are generally not responsible for “publishing” harmful user-generated content. Section 230 protects users’ online speech by protecting the intermediaries we all rely on to communicate via dating apps, social media, blogs, email, and other internet platforms.

The Ninth Circuit rightly affirmed the district court’s dismissal of all of the plaintiff’s claims. The court held that Section 230 bars nearly all of plaintiff’s claims (except the sex trafficking claim, which is exempted from Section 230). The court stated:

Each of Doe’s state law claims necessarily implicates Grindr’s role as a publisher of third-party content. The theory underpinning Doe’s claims for defective design, defective manufacturing, and negligence faults Grindr for facilitating communication among users for illegal activity….

The Ninth Circuit’s holding is important because many plaintiffs have tried in recent years to plead around Section 230 by framing their cases as seeking to hold internet platforms responsible for their own “defective designs,” rather than third-party content. Yet, a closer look at a plaintiff’s allegations often reveals that the plaintiff’s harm is indeed premised on third-party content—that’s true in this case, where the plaintiff exchanged messages with the adult men. As we argued in our brief:

Plaintiff’s claim here is based not on mere access to the app, but on the actions of a third party once John Doe logged in—messages exchanged between a third party and Doe, and ultimately, on unlawful acts occurring between them because of those communications.

Additionally, courts generally have concluded that an internet platform’s features that relate to how users can engage with the app and how third-party content is displayed and organized, are also “publishing” activities protected by Section 230.

As for the federal civil sex trafficking claim, the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff’s allegations failed to meet the statutory requirements. The court stated:

Doe must plausibly allege that Grindr ‘knowingly’ sex trafficked a person by a list of specified means. But the [complaint] merely shows that Grindr provided a platform that facilitated sharing of messages between users.

While the facts of this case are no doubt difficult, the Ninth Circuit reached the correct conclusion. Our modern communications are mediated by private companies, and any weakening of Section 230 immunity for internet platforms would stifle everyone’s ability to communicate, as companies would be incentivized to engage in greater censorship of users to mitigate their legal exposure.

This does not leave victims without redress—they may seek to hold perpetrators responsible directly. Importantly in this case, three of the perpetrators were criminally charged. And should facts show that an online service participated in criminal conduct, Section 230 would not block a federal prosecution. The court’s ruling demonstrates that Section 230 is working as Congress intended.

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